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Guaranteeing Bank Deposits

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GUARANTEEING BANK DEPOSITS.

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By

WILVAN J. RUSSELL

THESIS

FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS
IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

IN THE

COLLEGE OF LITERATURE AND ARTS

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

PRESENTED JUNE 1, 1909



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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

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ENTITLED Guaranteeing Bank Deposits.

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration.

Manner H. Robinson

J. C. Weston
Instructor in Charge

APPROVED:

D. Kinley

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF

Economics

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Chapter 1.

Various Attempts to Guarantee Bank Deposits.

The recent agitation throughout the United States for a guarantee fund for bank deposits is by no means a new one. The number of panics and bank failures in recent years has brought the plan again before the public. The increase of deposits in the banks of this country has been very great, and many people think that there should be greater security for their deposits. The banks alone have not been the only institutions which have been closely scrutinized by the people. Insurance companies and corporations have been closely examined, and attempts have been made to correct their defects.

The first attempt to secure bank deposits by a guarantee fund was made by the people of New York State, and their attempt did not prove in vain. In the year 1829 the State Legislature of New York passed the Safety Fund Law. The distinctive feature of this law was a provision which required the establishment of a common fund. Each banking corporation thereafter created or whose charter was renewed or extended was required to contribute annually a sum equal to one-half of one per cent of its capital stock paid in, the payments to be continued until every such corporation had contributed an amount equal to three per cent of its capital stock. The fund was to be in charge of the State Comptroller and the State Treasurer, and the income was to be returned to the banks after the expenses were paid. Whenever the fund was reduced by payment on account of insolvency, the several banks were required to continue their annual contributions until the limit

of three per cent of the aggregate capital of all banks was reached.*

The immediate effect of the passage of the "Safety Fund Act" was to stimulate the growth of the banking business in New York State. During the year of the passage of the act no less than eleven new institutions sprang into existence, while sixteen banks whose charters expired had been renewed. In 1830 nine more new banks were established. These were followed by nine new associations in 1831, while eight New York City banks renewed their charters. The following year seven new banks were established and two rechartered. In the course of the years 1833-1836, inclusive, no less than twenty-eight new banks were chartered. By the end of 1839 or ten years after the enactment of this law, a total of ninety-three banks had either been rechartered or newly established with a combined capital of \$38,000,000. This compared with thirty banks in existence at the time of the passage of the law.*

In spite of this rapid creation of new banks, the Safety Fund Act had been in existence nine years or until May, 1837 before there was any occasion to draw upon the reserve it created. In the year 1837, the Safety Fund was drawn on for the first time. Three banks with a circulation of \$413,961 received \$54,483 from the fund. These banks were not insolvent, and they speedily repaid the amount advanced from the fund. Charters of two other banks were repealed the same year, but one was revived shortly thereafter. Thus the Safety Fund was virtually intact when the great crash of 1840-1842 came. This disastrous series of bank failures was inaugurated by the City Bank of Buffalo, which went

* Wall St. Summary, Sept. 30, 1908.

* John J. Knox-History of Banking pp. 404.

1. The first part of the report, the "Introduction", sets out the purpose of the study and the scope of the work. It also provides a brief overview of the findings.

2. The second part, the "Methodology", describes the methods used to collect and analyze the data. This includes a discussion of the sample, the data collection process, and the statistical techniques used.

3. The third part, the "Results", presents the findings of the study. This section is divided into several sub-sections, each dealing with a different aspect of the research.

4. The fourth part, the "Discussion", interprets the results and discusses their implications. It also identifies the strengths and limitations of the study.

5. The final part, the "Conclusion", summarizes the main findings and provides recommendations for future research.

under Feb. 3, 1840. In December of the same year, the Wayne County Bank failed. A year later the Commercial Bank of New York failed, followed by the Bank of Buffalo. Two more banks failed before the close of 1841, and before October of the ensuing year five additional banks had gone into the hands of receivers. In the case of the first three failures, the Comptroller proceeded to redeem notes as fast as presented in accordance with the Act of 1837, which amended the original law so as to provide that immediate payment should be made of notes of insolvent banks, whose liabilities in excess of assets should not exceed two-thirds of the fund. However when the Bank of Buffalo went under with outstanding circulation to \$400,000 or \$100,000 more than the sum available in the fund, the Comptroller announced his inability to redeem its notes. While he had a fund of \$300,000 he felt under obligations to apply this sum to the liquidation of the claims^s of depositors and other creditors of banks which had previously failed*.

The collapse of the Safety Fund was thus complete, although only four banks had failed up to that time. Two weeks after the Bank of Buffalo failed a third institution of the same city, the Commercial Bank of Buffalo collapsed. Three weeks later another state bank failed, and then came the cataclysm of 1842 when five banks went under in rapid sequence within less than nine months.

Desperate efforts had already been made to save the fund, and prevent further disaster. The Legislature by the Act of May 26, 1841 amended the Safety Fund Law so as to require solvent banks to anticipate payment of assessments, if necessary to reimburse the fund. The Comptroller immediately availed himself of the

* Wall St. Summary, Sept. 30, 1908

authority thus conferred , but the fund was wholly inadequate to meet the demand upon it.

Up to this time the Comptroller had considered all creditors on an equal basis. The courts had been appealed to and upheld his interpretation of the law calling forth a vigorous protest by the Bank Commissioner, who maintained that the Safety Fund was primarily designated to secure bank note holders and not depositors and other creditors*

On April 12, 1842 the Legislature passed a bill providing that upon payment of the liabilities then charged against the fund, it should thereafter be applied only to the redemption of the circulating notes of the failed banks. It was not until 1851 that the Comptroller finally completed payment of the debts of eleven banks which had failed in the years 1840, 1841, and 1842. During that period the capital stock of the insolvent banks aggregated \$3,150,000 and their circulation \$2,675,000. The Safety Fund contributed \$1,615,302 toward redemption of their notes and \$1,088,109 toward the payment of their remaining debts. A failure in 1848, another in 1854, and three more in the panic year 1857 completed the list. In 1867 the last payment out of the fund was made. During the period of its operation contributions to the fund amounted to \$3,104,999.51, and disbursements to \$2,600,000 the balance having been expended as interest on advances made to the fund at various times.**

Vermont's Bank Guarantee System was established by a law enacted in 1831, modeled closely on the Safety Fund Act of New York

* Review of Reviews, Vol, 37, pp. 347.

* Wall St. Journal, Sept. 30, 1908.

* John J. Knox-History of Banking, pp.404.

As in the case of the latter it was designed to create a fund out of which creditors of any bank that should become insolvent might be paid. For this purpose each bank chartered thereafter was required to pay into the State Treasury the sum of four and one half per cent upon the amount of its capital stock in six annual installments. In the case the fund was reduced, it was to be augmented by assessments made by the State Treasurer. The fund until used was to remain the property of the respective banks contributing, and the income after paying expenses was to be paid to such banks annually*.

An example of its practical working is found in the history of the Essex Bank, which in 1839 went into a receiver's hands. This bank had been incorporated in 1832 under the Safety Fund Law with a capital of \$40,000 and a paid up capital of \$25,000. When it failed a large part of extensive loans made to persons outside of the State proved uncollectable. Its statement showed a circulation of \$66,262 and deposits of \$3,798 to meet which there were bills discounted aggregating \$98,537. After an examination the Bank Commissioner reported that the combined assets and the entire fund would not only prove inadequate to redeem the bills of the bank, but the entire assessment which the banks then chartered would be required to pay in under the law would not suffice for that purpose. In 1840 an act was passed limiting the circulation to twice the paid up capital instead of three times its amount as formerly allowed*. In 1842 the General Assembly passed an additional act relating to banks, the important part of which was a provision that banks thereafter chartered might

* Wall St. Summary, Oct. 4, 1908

* John J. Knox-History of Banking, pp.355

be relieved from the contribution to the Safety Fund if the directors should execute satisfactory bonds with the condition that they should "at all times pay and redeem according to law all bills issued by such bank, and should pay and refund all deposits made in such bank when such payments were demanded". This act also required not only that one-half of the capital should be paid before the bank went into operation, but that the other half should be paid in within two years. Loans to directors, stockholders, and individuals were also more strictly limited than heretofore.

The Free Banking Act of 1851 permitted the organization of banks of \$50,000 and not more than \$200,000 capital and allowed them to issue notes on a pledge of United States stocks and certain state stocks deposited with the State Treasurer. This law was somewhat less stringent than the previous ones, and there were but four banks organized under it. While this law was in existence some thirteen banks procured charters permitting them to transact business under the more stringent Act of 1840. They preferred to voluntarily impose upon themselves conditions which would inspire public confidence rather than take the advantage of the greater freedom of the new act. The panic of 1857 showed that these banks were on a solid foundation, for although their circulation was reduced one-half in sixty days they continued to pay specie on demand. With the taking effect of the National Banking Act, State Banks in Vermont ceased to exist*.

* John J. Knox-History of Banking, pp.355.

Condition of State Banks of Vermont before National Bank Act.

Table.

No. of						
Years:	Banks:	Loans&Dis:	Specie:	Cap. Stock:	Circulation:	Dep.
1834 :	17 :	\$1,879,813:	\$59,958:	\$921,815 :	\$1,463,713 :	\$180,792
1839 :	19 :	2,888,812:	129,319:	1,325,530 :	1,966,812 :	308,349
1844 :	17 :	2,225,245:	92,562:	1,137,500 :	1,743,807 :	289,079
1849 :	24 :	3,613,227:	120,798:	1,826,975 :	2,322,962 :	330,195
1854 :	40 :	6,572,951:	196,680:	3,275,656 :	3,986,709 :	745,170
1859 :	46 :	6,946,523:	198,409:	4,029,240 :	3,882,983 :	787,839

*

In 1836 the Legislature of Michigan took up measures compelling all banks chartered up to that time as well as all those that should thereafter receive charters to provide a Safety Fund for the payment of the debts of any of their number which should fail. This was a copy of the New York Safety Fund System, adopted in 1829, and like that required the banks to contribute annually one-half of one per cent of the capital until they had contributed three per cent of such capital. There was no provision for enforcing the payment to the safety fund, as some of the chartered banks complied with the law and some did not. The fund, however, gave the bills of the chartered banks some reputation of superiority over the bills of the banks under the free banking system authorized in 1837*.

The Deposit Guarantee Law of Oklahoma went into effect in March, 1908. I will discuss this law in the following chapter.

The Nebraska Legislature passed the Bank Guarantee Law on March, 25, 1909. This law includes in the guarantee scheme all state banks and private banks receiving money subject to check, pass-books or draft, but bars national banks from the association. The law provides for a State banking Board consisting of the Governor, Auditor, and Attorney-General. This board shall control the enforcement of the new law. The law gives additional powers to the governor by authorizing him to appoint the secretary of the board at a salary of \$3,000 per year, and three bank examiners at salaries of \$1,800 per year each. The Nebraska law provides for a levy of one-fourth of one per cent of their daily deposits four times a year which levy goes to form the guarantee fund in each of the banks taking part.

* John J. Knox-History of Banking, pp.732

It does not specify which deposits shall be guaranteed and which shall not, but it protects the banks in the matter by providing that no bank shall be allowed to pay over four per cent on deposits. When a bank appears to the Banking Board to be in an insolvent condition, then the Board can appeal to the Attorney-General, and the latter makes complaint to the judge of the District Court in which the bank is located, and the judge can appoint a receiver. If there is sufficient money at the disposal of the receiver to pay off all depositors, the receiver can call on the State Banking Board for the amount necessary to make up the deficit*.

The State Legislature of Kansas last winter passed a Bank Guarantee Law. This law provides that a bank must be in operation one year before it is eligible to join the association; the bank must be certified to be in the first class condition by a bank examiner; the bank is assessed one-twentieth of one per cent of its deposits, or so much as necessary to maintain the association funds at \$500,000. In addition it must put up a \$500 bond for every \$1,000,000 deposits as a pledge to pay assessments; the interest on these bonds goes to the bank. If a bank fails, a receiver is appointed by the Bank Examiner, who issues to each depositor a certificate of indebtedness at the legal interest rate, and winds up its affairs. Any difference in liabilities and assets is paid from the guarantee fund. Any time a bank violates a State Law or departs from sound banking, the Bank Commissioner may wind up its affairs. Assessments are limited to not over five in one year, making the maximum one fourth of one per cent.*

* American Banker Vol. lxxiv, pp.1260

* American Banker Vol. lxxiv, pp.1258

A group of one hundred banks in Georgia and Florida have a mutual depositor's guarantee. Chartered banks of Mexico have long maintained a voluntary league among themselves under the practical working of which, all come to the aid of each other in time of peril whether from internal or external cause with the result that no such bank has failed, and hence no depositor has suffered loss since the system was adopted under the advice of President Diaz*.

* Review of Reviews Vol. 37, pp. 346.

Appendix.

The following table shows the number of failures of Private and State Banks in the United States during the years 1864-1906. In discussing the guarantee scheme it is essential to know the number of failures that occurred and the conditions of the defunct institutions.

Table.

Year	Failures	Capital	Assets	Liabilities.
1864	2	\$:	:	:
1865	5	125,000:\$	245,401.97:\$	225,662.14
1866	5	275,000:	1,206,035.00:	890,112.00
1867	3	260,000:	222,075.00:	138,821.00
1868	7	276,381:	183,002.30:	148,886.00
1869	6	100,000:	77,861.00:	361,961.73
1870	1	:	:	50,000.00
1871	7	220,000:	2,314,871.90:	2,654,187.15
1872	10	470,000:	2,126,124.18:	3,059,318.06
1873	33	907,000:	4,644,889.91:	6,938,653.01
1874	40	770,000:	4,125,731.00:	4,562,879.00
1875	14	2,413,900:	9,190,283.98:	12,365,475.25
1876	37	961,000:	7,312,218.73:	9,206,429.34
1877	63	2,491,250:	13,137,835.47:	15,223,785.49
1878	70	3,250,193:	26,001,949.67:	27,269,520.51
1879	20	1,370,465:	5,102,691.94:	5,253,307.22
1880	10	452,200:	1,629,146.61:	1,311,799.49
1881	9	436,750:	585,653.06:	1,785,890.45
1882	19	545,000:	2,765,951.10:	2,608,489.57
1883	27	870,000:	2,813,915.19:	3,193,747.39
1884	54	1,718,596:	12,900,819.05:	15,508,389.70
1885	32	1,099,400:	2,982,879.51:	4,883,454.27
1886	13	254,000:	1,300,536.30:	1,140,824.48
1887	19	931,590:	2,865,300.30:	3,074,622.29
1888	17	745,500:	2,805,326.52:	3,342,336.52
1889	15	363,250:	1,279,900.68:	2,147,057.18
1890	30	2,169,568:	10,692,385.98:	13,358,584.64
1891	44	2,071,300:	7,190,824.69:	6,365,198.77
1892	27	578,840:	2,719,410.75:	3,227,608.56
1893	261	16,641,637:	54,828,690.65:	46,766,818.80
1894	71	3,112,447:	7,958,284.18:	7,218,319.51
1895	115	3,906,350:	11,276,529.99:	9,010,584.93
1896	78	3,400,642:	10,240,244.97:	7,513,837.41
1897	122	:	17,929,163.00:	24,090,879.00
1898	53	:	4,493,577.00:	7,080,190.00
1899	26	:	7,790,244.00:	10,448,159.00
1900	32	:	7,675,792.00:	11,421,028.00
1901	56	:	6,373,372.00:	13,334,629.00
1902	43	:	7,323,757.00:	10,332,666.00

Annex 1

The following table shows the number of persons of various nationalities in the United States during the year 1900. It is estimated that the number of persons of each nationality is as shown in the following table.

Nationality	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
American	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
British	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
French	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
German	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Italian	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Japanese	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Korean	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Latin American	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Polish	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Russian	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Spanish	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Swedish	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Swiss	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Ukrainian	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000
Yugoslavian	1,000,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	3,500,000	4,000,000	4,500,000	5,000,000	5,500,000	6,000,000

Table (cont.)

Year	: Failures	: Capital	: Assets	: Liabilities
1903	: 26	: \$	2,166,852.00	: \$ 4,005,643.00
1904	: 102	: :	24,296,823.00	: 31,774,895.00
1905	: 57	: :	6,591,515.00	: 10,273,023.00
1906	: 37	: :	6,591,515.00	: 7,187,858.00

The total number of failures during the year 1906 was thirty seven, the assets of the banks being \$6,591,515 and the liabilities \$7,187,858. Included in the thirty seven failures of 1906 were 15 state banks, 5 savings banks, 4 trust companies and 13 private banks. The failures by geographical sections were as follows: New England, 3. Eastern States, 2. Southern States, 16; Middle Western, 14, Western States, 1. Pacific States, 1. The assets of the 16 banks which failed in the Southern States amounted to \$5,110,414 and their liabilities to \$4,806,924. The assets of the 21 banks failing in the other section aggregated \$1,481,101 and liabilities \$2,380,934*.

The following table shows the growth of banking in the United States including island possessions, as indicated by the number of banks and capital stock from 1902 to 1906.

Bank	Number	Capital
1902		
National	4,535	\$701,990,554
State	7,889	499,621,208
Reporting capital only	3,732	138,548,654
Total	16,156	1,340,160,416
1903		
National	4,939	\$743,506,048
State	8,745	578,418,944
Reporting capital only	4,546	152,403,520
Total	18,230	1,474,328,512
1904		
National	5,331	\$767,378,148
State	9,519	625,116,824
Reporting capital only	2,994	81,409,702
Total	18,844	1,473,904,674

* Report of Comptroller 1906, pp.40

1955	1954	1953	1952	1951	1950
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000

The following table shows the results of the survey conducted in 1955. The results are given in thousands of dollars. The first column shows the total amount of the survey, the second column shows the amount of the survey which was paid for by the Government, and the third column shows the amount of the survey which was paid for by the private sector. The fourth column shows the amount of the survey which was paid for by the Government and the private sector together. The fifth column shows the amount of the survey which was paid for by the Government and the private sector together, but excluding the amount of the survey which was paid for by the Government.

The following table shows the results of the survey conducted in 1954. The results are given in thousands of dollars. The first column shows the total amount of the survey, the second column shows the amount of the survey which was paid for by the Government, and the third column shows the amount of the survey which was paid for by the private sector. The fourth column shows the amount of the survey which was paid for by the Government and the private sector together. The fifth column shows the amount of the survey which was paid for by the Government and the private sector together, but excluding the amount of the survey which was paid for by the Government.

1955	1954	1953	1952	1951	1950
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000

1905	Number	Capital
National	5,668	\$791,567,231
State	10,742	671,599,149
Nonreporting	3,500	76,664,000
Total	19,910	1,539,830,380
1906		
National	6,053	\$826,129,785
State	11,852	739,163,401
Nonreporting	3,491	75,356,000
Total	21,396	1,640,649,186

Since 1902 the increase in the number of banks has been 5,240, capital stock has increased in the sum of \$300,488,770*.

* Report of Comptroller of Currency 1906, pp. 45

TABLE I		
Year	Population	Area
1900	1,000,000	100,000
1910	1,500,000	150,000
1920	2,000,000	200,000
1930	2,500,000	250,000
1940	3,000,000	300,000
1950	3,500,000	350,000
1960	4,000,000	400,000
1970	4,500,000	450,000
1980	5,000,000	500,000
1990	5,500,000	550,000
2000	6,000,000	600,000

TABLE I. Population and Area of the United States, 1900-2000.

TABLE II. Population and Area of the United States, 1900-2000.

Year	Population	Area
1900	1,000,000	100,000
1910	1,500,000	150,000
1920	2,000,000	200,000
1930	2,500,000	250,000
1940	3,000,000	300,000
1950	3,500,000	350,000
1960	4,000,000	400,000
1970	4,500,000	450,000
1980	5,000,000	500,000
1990	5,500,000	550,000
2000	6,000,000	600,000

The following table shows the increase in deposits in National banks from 1863-1906.

National Banks.

Year	Banks	Individual Deposits.
1863	66	\$ 8,497,681.84
1864	508	122,166,536.40
1865	1513	500,910,873.22
1866	1644	564,616,777.64
1867	1642	540,797,837.51
1868	1643	580,940,820.85
1869	1817	511,400,196.63
1870	1648	507,368,618.67
1871	1790	596,587,487.54
1872	1940	682,846,607.45
1873	1976	618,517,245.74
1874	2027	619,350,223.06
1875	2086	604,512,514.52
1876	2082	619,350,223.06
1877	2074	604,512,514.52
1878	2055	598,805,775.56
1879	2052	775,495,966.01
1880	2095	1,066,901,719.85
1881	2164	1,102,679,163.71
1882	2308	1,066,901,719.85
1883	2529	1,106,453,008.23
1884	2664	987,649,055.68
1885	2732	1,111,429,914.98
1886	2875	1,169,716,413.13
1887	3070	1,235,757,941.59
1888	3150	1,331,265,617.08
1889	3326	1,436,402,685.65
1890	3573	1,485,095,855.70
1891	3692	1,602,052,766.59
1892	3784	1,764,456,177.11
1893	3783	1,539,399,795.23
1894	3737	1,695,485,346.08
1895	3706	1,729,550,241.03
1896	3661	1,629,688,393.60
1897	3606	1,729,550,241.03
1898	3590	2,225,269,813.21
1899	3602	2,380,610,361.43
1900	3942	2,623,997,521.88
1901	4291	2,964,417,965.82
1902	4666	3,152,878,796.65
1903	5118	3,176,201,572.89
1904	5477	3,707,706,530.93
1905	5833	3,989,522,834.51
1906	6137	4,199,938,310.35

Table.

Insolvent National Banks.

Number of Insolvent Banks, Amount of Loss to Creditor's,
Per cent of Loss, and Ratio of Loss to Individual deposits, by years
1865 to 1904.

Year	No.	Amount of Loss	Per cent of Loss	Per cent of Loss to dep.s in Nat. Bks in operation
1865	1	\$51,278	42.00	.010
1866	2	836,888	75.60	.148
1867	7	902,048	26.86	.167
1868	3	69,792	22.65	.012
1869	2	46,627	19.43	.009
1870				
1871				
1872	6	358,424	14.00	.058
1873	11	1,877,165	27.08	.301
1874	3	172,283	45.75	.026
1875	5	1,921,553	74.87	.289
1876	9	371,350	26.67	.037
1877	10	60,091	1.65	.010
1878	14	404,923	14.78	.065
1879	8	224,190	20.22	.031
1880	3	754,638	70.14	.006
1881				
1882	3	2,201,872	37.01	.196
1883	2	158,390	25.90	.015
1884	11	1,522,830	23.95	.156
1885	4	859,084	22.75	.078
1886	8	45,173	5.27	.004
1887	8	1,977,652	37.57	.158
1888	2	751,716	20.93	.056
1889	2			
1890	9	297,002	26.77	.019
1891	25	4,192,206	61.83	.264
1892	16	1,946,379	17.92	.110
1893	66	-----		
1894	21	'		
1895	36	'		
1896	27	'		
1897	38	'		
1898	7	'		
1899	12	'-21,725,422	29.21	
1900	6	'		
1901	11	'		
1902	2	'		
1903	12	'		
1904	20	'		

RECEIPTS

Amount of money received during the year

and of the balance on hand at the beginning of the year

For the year

For the year

For the year

For the year

For the year

For the year

For the year

For the year

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For the year

Aggregate	438	\$147,309,310	29.21	
Average	11	3,682,732	29.21	.0807

*

Table

Per capita circulation of money in the United States.

Per capita

Gold	Silver	Paper	Total
\$16.91	\$8.18	\$6.93	\$32.02*

* Report of Comptroller of Currency 1906 pp.351
 * " " " " " " 431

Chapter II.

The Oklahoma Law.

Article II.

Section 1, The State Banking Board shall be composed of the Governor, the Lieutenant-Governor, the President of the Board of Agriculture, State Treasurer, and the State Auditor. Said Board shall have the supervision and management of the Depositor's Guaranty Fund hereinafter provided for, and shall have the power to adopt all suitable rules and regulations not inconsistent with the law, for the management and administration of the same.

Section II. The State Banking Board shall levy against capital stock an assessment of one per cent of the bank's daily average of deposits, less the deposits of the United States and State Fund, if otherwise secured, for the preceeding year, upon each and every bank and trust company organized or existing under the laws of this State, for the purpose of creating a Depositor's Guaranty Fund. Said assessment shall be collected upon call of the State Banking Board. In one year from the time the first assessment is levied, and annually thereafter; each bank and trust company subject to the provision of this Act shall report to the Bank Commissioner the amount of its average daily deposits for the preceeding year, and if such deposits are excess of the amount upon which one per cent was previously paid, said reports shall be accompanied by additional funds to equal one per cent of the daily average excess of deposits less the deposits of the State Fund, if otherwise secured and less the deposits of the United States government for the year over the preceeding year, and each amount shall be added to the depositor's guaranty fund. If the depositor's guaranty fund is depleted from any cause it

shall be the duty of the State Banking Board in order to keep said fund up to one per cent of the total liabilities in all of the said banks and trust companies subject to the provision of this Act, to levy a special assessment to cover such deficiency, which special assessment shall be levied upon the capital stock of the banks and trust companies subject to this Act, according to the amount of their deposits as reported in the office of the Bank Commissioner. And such special assessment shall become immediately due and payable.

Section 3. Banks and trust companies organized subsequent to the enactment of this Act shall pay into the depositor's guaranty fund, three per cent of the amount of their capital stock when they open for business, which amount shall constitute a credit fund subject to adjustment on the basis of the deposits as provided for other banks and trust companies now existing at the end of one year; Provided, however, said three per cent payment shall not be required of new banks and trust companies formed by the re-organization or consolidation of banks and trust companies that have previously complied with the terms of this Act.

Section 4. Any National bank in this State approved by the bank commissioner may voluntarily avail its depositor's of the protection of the depositor's guaranty fund by application to the State Banking Board in writing and the said application may be sustained upon terms and conditions in harmony with the purpose of this Act, to be agreed upon by the State Banking Board and the Bank Commissioner; Provided, that in the event National banks should be required by the Federal enactments to pay assessments to any depositor's guaranty fund of the Federal Government and

thereby the deposits of the National banks in this State should be guaranteed by virtue of Federal laws, that the national banks having availed themselves of the benefits of this Act, may withdraw therefrom and have returned to them ninety per cent of the unused portion of all assessments levied upon and paid by such banks.

Section 5. Whenever any bank or trust company organized or existing under the laws of this state shall voluntarily place itself in the hands of the bank commissioner, or, whenever any judgment shall be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and judging and decreeing that such bank or trust company is insolvent, or whenever the bank commissioner shall become satisfied of the insolvency of any such bank or trust company, he may after due examination of its affairs take possession of said bank or trust company, and its assets and proceeds to wind up its affairs and enforce the personal liability of the stock-holders, officers and directors.

Section 6. In the event that the bank commissioner shall take possession of any bank or trust company which is subject to the provision of this Act, the depositors of said bank or trust company shall be paid in full and when the cash available or that can be made immediately available of said bank or trust company is insufficient to discharge its obligations to depositors the said banking board shall draw from the depositor's guarantee fund and from additional assessments if required, as provided in Section two, the amount necessary to make up the deficiency, and the State shall have for the benefit of the depositor's guarantee fund a first lien upon the assets of said

bank or trust company, and all liabilities against the stockholders, officers and directors of said bank or trust company and against all other persons, corporations or firms. Such liabilities may be enforced by the State for the benefit of the depositor's guaranty fund.

Section 7. The bank commissioner shall take possession of the books, records and assets of every description of such bank or trust company, collect debts, dues, and claims belonging to it, and upon order of the District Court, or judge thereof, may sell or compound all bad or doubtful debts, and on like order may all the real or personal property of such bank or trust company upon such terms as the court or judge thereof may direct, and may if necessary, pay the debts of such bank or trust company, and enforce the liabilities of the stockholders, officers and directors; Provided, however, that bad or doubtful debts as used in this section shall not include the liabilities of stockholders, officers or directors.

Section 8. The bank commissioner shall deliver to each bank or trust company that has complied with the provisions of this Act a certificate stating that said bank or trust company has complied with the laws of this State for the protection of bank depositors and that safety to its depositors is guaranteed by the depositor's guaranty fund of Oklahoma. Such certificate shall be conspicuously displayed in its place of business and said bank or trust company may print or engrave upon its stationery and advertising matter words to the effect that its depositors are protected by the Depositor's Guaranty Fund of the State Of Oklahoma. The printing or engraving of a false statement to the fact last before

this named, is hereby declared to be felony.

Section 9. After the bank commissioner shall have taken possession of any bank or trust company which is subject to the provision of this Act, the stockholders thereof may repair its credit, restore or substitute its reserves, and otherwise place it in condition so that it is qualified to do a general banking business as before it was taken possession of by the bank commissioner; but such bank shall not be permitted to open its business until the bank commissioner, after a careful investigation of its affairs is of the opinion that its stockholders have complied with the laws, that the banks credit and funds are in all respects repaired, and all advances, if any, made from the depositor's guaranty fund fully repaid, its reserve restored or sufficiently substituted, and that it should be permitted again to re-open for business; whereupon said bank commissioner is authorized to issue written permission for the re-opening of said bank in the same manner as permission to do business is granted after the incorporation thereof, and thereupon said bank may be re-opened to do a general banking business.

Section 10. Any bank or trust company which has complied with the provisions of this Act, shall be eligible to act as a depository of State funds, or any fund under control of the State or any officer thereof, upon compliance with the laws of this state relating to the deposits of public funds*
*

The Oklahoma law provides that the State Banking Board consisting of the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, the President of the Board of Agriculture, State Treasurer, and State Auditor shall levy an assessment of one per cent of the banks average

* Constitution of Oklahoma.

daily deposits for the guarantee fund, while the early laws of New York and Michigan provided that an assessment of one-half of one per cent of the bank's capital stock should be made until three per cent of its capital stock was reached. The Vermont law in 1831 provided that each bank was required to pay into the State Treasury four and one-half percent of its capital stock in six annual installments. All these laws provided that special assessments shall be made whenever the guarantee fund is depleted by the failure of a bank. The Nebraska Law like that of Oklahoma provides for the levying of an assessment of one per cent of a bank's average daily deposits. Under the Kansas Law banks are assessed one-twentieth of one per cent of their deposits or so much as necessary to maintain the association funds at \$500,000. Each bank is required to put up a \$500 bond for each \$100,000 of deposits.

The Oklahoma Law provides that any national bank in the state if approved by the bank commissioner may avail itself of the protection of the depositor's guarantee fund. On August 1, 1908, Attorney General Bonaparte rendered an opinion to the effect that national banks could not be permitted to take advantage of the law of Oklahoma on the ground that contributions to the fund amounted to a contract by a bank to guarantee the obligations of a third party.** The Nebraska law includes all state and private bankers, but bars all national banks from joining the association.

One of the misconceptions concerning this law and a wide spread one, is that the State Government stands pledged to pay all bank losses. This is far from being the case. The State

* Wall St. Journal, Aug. 4, 1908.

* Wall St. Summary, Aug. 10, 1908.

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Government does not stand pledged to pay any bank losses. The credit of the state is not in any way pledged to the payment of deposits in any bank. Losses do not become a liability of the state. They would have to be replaced by another assessment. The State Banking Board is not required by law to give any kind of an indemnity bond as security for the fund. The guarantee fund is not kept in cash in the State Treasury, but is re-deposited in the banks, and is kept loaned out by them. The Oklahoma law provides for a small segregation of a certain small per cent of the assets of the State banks. If loans made from it can not be cashed promptly the losses can not be paid.

Between Jan. 1, and Oct. 31, 1908, forty-seven new state banks and two national banks were organized in Oklahoma. All but five of these were capitalized at only \$10,000. Twenty-two of these were state banks reorganized under the provisions of the new law.

Up to the time of Attorney-General Boaparte's decision, fifty seven national banks took up the plan. After the decision forty-five of the national banks withdrew, and the remaining twelve were converted into State banks.*

The mania for starting new banks is not confined to the towns alone. In the little village of Harrah, which has about one-hundred and fifty inhabitants, two banks have been organized, their total local deposits being less than \$15,000.

Men of indifferent character are allowed to organize banks. One of the new banks in Oklahoma was started by a man released from the penitentiary; another by a man who had twice failed in business and had then organized a national bank. In this he had obtained only \$27,000 in deposits on a capital of \$25,000.

*Journal of Pol. Econ. Vol. 67, ppl.

1. The first of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex system, and the complexity is not only in the number of components, but also in the way they are interconnected. This complexity is what makes the system so difficult to understand and to control.

2. The second of these is the fact that the system is not a static one. It is a dynamic system, and the components are constantly changing. This dynamic nature is what makes the system so difficult to predict and to control.

3. The third of these is the fact that the system is not a linear one. It is a non-linear system, and the components are not simply added together. This non-linearity is what makes the system so difficult to model and to control.

4. The fourth of these is the fact that the system is not a deterministic one. It is a stochastic system, and the components are subject to random fluctuations. This stochastic nature is what makes the system so difficult to predict and to control.

5. The fifth of these is the fact that the system is not a single one. It is a multi-component system, and the components are not simply added together. This multi-component nature is what makes the system so difficult to understand and to control.

6. The sixth of these is the fact that the system is not a single one. It is a multi-component system, and the components are not simply added together. This multi-component nature is what makes the system so difficult to understand and to control.

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10. The tenth of these is the fact that the system is not a single one. It is a multi-component system, and the components are not simply added together. This multi-component nature is what makes the system so difficult to understand and to control.

On the first of last July he started a State bank under the new law and by September 23, his deposits amounted to \$111,381.75. In another case a saloon-keeper had been forced out of business by the prohibition law, started a bank on very small capital, and very soon had deposits to the amount of \$30,000 or \$40,000*.

The Oklahoma law does not contemplate building up from year to year a fund large enough to meet financial contingencies, but simply keeps the fund equal to one per cent of the total deposits at any one time. There is nothing in the law that proposes to increase the security underlying all deposits, capital, surplus, undivided profits, reserves, and stockholders liabilities. The law has led to the reduction of capital in numerous cases of reorganization, and organization of new banks on a legal basis. The Oklahoma Law fails to discriminate between cash and credit deposits. Most people overlook the fact that eighty-five or ninety per cent of all bank deposits are really created by loans. The business man gives his note to the bank and gets in return the credit of the bank which is negotiable. The Oklahoma law therefore protects creditors of banks who become such by reason of loans made by themselves or others.

Appendix.

The following table shows the condition in the State Banks of Oklahoma and Indian Territory-1890-1906.

Oklahoma.				
Table.		Amounts in thousands.		
Date.	No. Of Banks.	Capital.	Deposits.	Total Assets.
1890	3	\$200	\$ 169	\$408
1891	2	200	242	510
1892	4	185	662	936
1893	6	300	592	1077
1894	6	300	604	1089
1895	5	250	651	1033
1896	5	250	449	828
1897	5	250	676	1093
1898	6	300	923	1378
1899	8	400	1438	2116
1900	24	865	2956	4706
1901	46	1558	8389	12226
1902	67	2270	9482	14897
1903	85	3935	11977	19482
1904	95	3625	10656	18426
1905	98	3780	12822	21881
1906	118	4260	17690	28829

Indian Territory.

1890	2	110	\$ 61	\$ 210
1891	3	150	120	338
1892	6	349	349	876
1893	6	360	424	952
1894	6	360	938	1548
1895	7	410	689	1418
1896	8	460	700	1495
1897	10	595	1165	2135
1898	14	795	1454	2788
1899	15	860	1892	3356
1900	30	1317	2307	4577
1901	53	2100	4831	9359
1902	69	2779	5896	11917
1903	87	3955	7175	15182
1904	107	4680	8099	17705
1905	133	5629	11657	24059
1906	151	6465	14068	28999*

Table.

Abstract of Report of condition of State Banks in Oklahoma and

Indian Territory(now Oklahoma)

No. of banks. Total resources Capital Stock Individual Dep.

OKLA.	283	\$14,505,367	\$2,934,700	\$10,346, 086
I. T.	57	3,538,299	1,362,300	1,752,833

* Report of Comptroller of Currency 1906, pp. 490.

** Report of Comptroller of Currency 1906, pp. 357.

Chapter III.

Arguments in Favor of Guaranteeing Bank Deposits.

Our complex and colossal business fabric rests upon the banks of the country; in turn the banks depend for their solvency and continued usefulness upon a mutual confidence between themselves and their depositors, which exists in prosperous times, but suddenly disappears when needed in times of stress.

The banks borrow the money with the agreement that it shall be repaid in cash on demand. Banks give no security in return, save a memorandum entry in a pass book. A bank may lawfully borrow returnable on demand, ten or more times the amount of the paid in capital, and then proceed to loan 75% of the whole on time notes. They put beyond their reach for periods ranging from thirty days to six months a very large amount of borrowed money. If the present banking system can be said to have a foundation, it consists of confidence on the part of average depositors of all classes that their money can be and always will be repaid on demand.

One of the arguments put forth by the advocates of the guarantee fund is that it will increase the confidence of the depositors. Mutual confidence between banks and their depositors is an absolute necessity.

General A. B. Nettleton says; "Nothing will prevent future panics but absolute knowledge on the part of bank depositors that their money is safe". Deposit insurance would bring out many millions of dollars from places of hiding, and thus swell bank deposits, and benefit the whole community. This gain alone would more than compensate for their trifling contributions to the annual cost of deposit insurance. Well considered legislation providing for deposit insurance would (virtually) naturally include other

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

Published weekly, except on Sundays, by the American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610. Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Ill., and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes in this journal to THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610. This journal is published for the American Medical Association by the American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill. 60610. The American Medical Association is not responsible for the views or opinions expressed in this journal. The American Medical Association is not responsible for the views or opinions expressed in this journal. The American Medical Association is not responsible for the views or opinions expressed in this journal.

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safe-guards, such as prohibition of chains of banks under one owner-ship. The pecuniary interest which all solvent banks would have in limiting failures would lead them to use all their influence to check and expose the operations of unsafe bankers, and to make it virtually impossible for the wild-cat element to continue in the banking business.*

General Nettleton puts forth a good argument when he says "that depositors must have absolute knowledge that their money is safe." One of the best arguments given in favor of the guarantee fund is that it will include other legislation, which will add to the security of the depositors. I am of the belief that we can obtain the required banking legislation with out having a guarantee fund.

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~~safeguards, such as prohibition of clearing of banks under an owner-~~
~~ship.~~ General Nettleton says, " the pecuniary interest which all solvent banks would have in limiting bank failures would lead them to use all their special knowledge and influence to check and expose the operations of unsafe bankers. I think the policy at the present time is to expose all bad banking operations, and to correct them at once. Our banks use all their powers to prevent failures. In large cities there are clearing house associations. Banks which are members of clearing house associations have their operations closely scrutinized. Their bad banking methods are corrected. When a member of the clearing house needs financial assistance, the other members of the association come to its rescue. I am heartily in favor of the clearing house system, and believe it is one of the best parts of our banking system.

The advocates of the guarantee system contend that bankers are borrowers as well as those who receive loans from the banks.

Governor Hoch of Kansas gives this argument as follows. He said that the man behind the counter is as certainly a borrower as is the man in front of the counter, and that the demand for security for depositors is not more unreasonable than is the demand of the banker for security for his loans. The National Government recognizes that, and deposits no currency in a National bank until the deposit is amply secured.

Our National Banking Laws, provide that all shareholders of National banks are individually liable to the creditors of such a bank to any amount equal to and addition to the amount of stock held by them, respectively, for all debts and contracts made by such bank.* All reserve city banks are required to keep on hand

at all times in lawful money twenty-five per cent of the aggregated amount of the deposits in all respects, and every other association shall at all times have on hand, in lawful money of the United States, an amount equal to at least fifteen per cent of the aggregate amount of its deposits in all respects.*

These laws were passed for the security of the depositors and they should be strictly adhered to.

The Secretary of the Treasury requires all national banking associations designated as public depositories to give satisfactory security by the deposit of United States bonds and otherwise, for the safe-keeping and prompt payment of the public money deposited with them, and for the faithful performance of their duties as financial agents of the Government.*

The financial operations of our National Government are more important than those of any individual depositor. Governor Hoch places government deposits on a par with those of an individual. The financial operation of the United States should run no risk of being impaired.

Senator Owen of Oklahoma gives the following argument in favor of the guarantee fund:-1 It will have a powerful tendency to promote and establish the stability of our national commerce by the prevention of a panic. 2 Depositors from whom banks make their dividends are entitled to protection*

I do not believe a guarantee fund would prevent a panic. In a panic the people are afraid that they can not get their money immediately. They want to withdraw all their money from the banks. A safety fund would diminish this fear. It is denied by no one that depositors are entitled to protection.

* Commoner Vol. 8, pp. 3 National Banking Laws 1907 pp. 54
National Banking Laws 1907 pp. 24

One of the greatest defects in our present system of banking is the length of time required to settle the affairs of insolvent banks. Steps should be instituted to remedy this defect. The affairs of insolvent banks should be managed by competent officials who do not neglect the demands of the creditors.

Congressman Gaines of Tennessee learned from the Deputy Comptroller of the Currency that the average time required to settle the affairs of insolvent banks was four years, and that the annual loss to creditors of insolvent banks as estimated to be in 1894 to 1906, inclusive, based upon known results prior to that period was \$1,114,233. This report he says further, commenting upon the Comptroller's report, "states the amount of loss from 1865 to 1907 was \$47,911,583. "Then, Mr. Gaines comments, "For a depositor to wait on an average of four years to get back his deposits, and perhaps, lose a part of it, and all without his fault is oppressive and offensive, and does not encourage him nor any other creditor of the bank to seriously continue the present manner of conducting national banks".*

William Jennings Bryan one of the foremost exponents of the guarantee fund gave an address before the Economic Club of New York on the subject. His chief argument in favor of the plan was that "the guarantee fund would make all banks good, and that the big banks would not have the advantage over the little ones". Mr Bryan replies to the objection of the guarantee fund that the banks will be recklessly managed as follows, "The officers of the banks are selected by the directors, and the directors are chosen by the stockholders, and the stockholders would lose all of their surplus and then they would have (to) the 100% liability deposit before any-

other bank could lose anything.

I do not think that the guarantee fund would make all banks safe. The character of the officers of the bank determines to a large extent the success of the bank and the amount of its deposits. Officers and directors should be chosen who have strong characters and who would not violate the sacred trust put in them. They should strictly observe all the banking laws and regulations, and should carry on the banking operations in a careful and honest manner. Speculative and reckless management has been the cause of many bank failures.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

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Appendix.

Table

National Banks.

The relation of deposits to other assets, especially those of capital, surplus and profits.

1907	19.5	51.5	71
1906	18.8	52.4	71.2
1905	19.0	51.1	70.1
1904	20.8	49.6	70.4
1903	20.7	50.0	70.7

The tendency to carry a larger proportion of deposits on the basis of a given investment in capital etc. is evident in the comparison of the ratio in 1897 with that of 1907. In the former year (September) for each dollar of capital, the surplus and profit in national banks were \$1.92. In 1907 the ratio was \$1.00 to \$2.65. The ratio of capital alone to individual deposits in 1897 was \$1.00 to \$2.93*

* Wall St. Summary, Aug.27, 1908.

Table 1

Summary of results

The following table shows the results of the experiments conducted on the various subjects.

Results of the experiments

Subject	Condition	Mean	Standard Error	Significance
S1	Control	10.5	1.2	
	Experimental	12.5	1.5	
S2	Control	11.5	1.0	
	Experimental	13.5	1.2	
S3	Control	12.5	1.1	
	Experimental	14.5	1.3	
S4	Control	13.5	1.4	
	Experimental	15.5	1.6	
S5	Control	14.5	1.5	
	Experimental	16.5	1.7	

The results of the experiments are summarized in the following table.

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Chapter IV.

Arguments Against Guaranteeing Bank Deposits.

The ignorance of the public on all banking and financial questions is very great. This has been the cause of many financial embarrassments. The popular opinion of bank deposits is that they represent cash taken into the banks by individuals. The average person is ^cunacquainted with the workings of our ^{banking systems and is ready to follow} false economic principles concerning our banks.

Dean Kinley says; "The popular notion of bank deposits is that they represent cash taken into a bank by individuals and left there for safe-keeping to be drawn on at need. The figures of bank deposits reflect the loans made by the bank. A proposal to insure these deposits is therefore a proposal that the banks shall create a safety fund to secure the payment of the amounts they have agreed to loan either on commercial or personal paper. They have received no money. The proposal to create a safety fund is therefore, in the main, a proposal that the banks be taxed to insure the payment of what they promise to lend."*

One of the leading arguments in favor of the guarantee fund is that it will prevent a panic. This argument has been criticized very much.

Dean Kinley says, "such a scheme would not prevent runs. In a panic the people are afraid that they can not get their money immediately. This fear will not be removed by the knowledge that they can finally get one-fourth or one-third of it, according to the proportion of the safety fund. They will insist on drawing out their funds when a scare comes".*

* Review of Reviews Vol. 37, pp. 345

* Review of Reviews Vol. 37, pp. 345

Appendix to the Report of the Committee on the Administration of Justice

The Committee on the Administration of Justice has been set up to examine the working of the courts and to make recommendations for their improvement. It has held many public hearings and has received many suggestions from the public. It has also held many private hearings and has received many suggestions from the judges and the lawyers. It has also held many private hearings and has received many suggestions from the judges and the lawyers.

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Former Governor Myron B. Herrick said. "The guaranteeing of bank deposits would no more prevent a panic than fire insurance a conflagration.*

I agree with Dean Kinley when he says the guarantee fund would not prevent runs on a bank. If the depositors know that the bank is conservatively and economically managed they will have no fear of losing their deposits, and will not make runs upon a bank. The vital point is that the banks should be honestly managed. A guarantee fund will not cause banks to be conservatively managed.

One very common argument against the guarantee fund is that under it there would be no premium for conservatism and integrity. Conservative managed banks would have to pay debts of banks which have been dishonestly managed.

Had the proposed Bryan bill been in effect for the last ten years Congressman Hill of Connecticut shows that the banks of the State of Connecticut would have received in return for the expenditures for insurance, the sum of \$ 31,387 the balance going to pay the debts of banks in other sections of the country, for which they were in no way responsible financially or morally. In this way depositors in conservatively managed institutions would be partners with an unknown and unlimited liability with all the banks of the United States. The total tax for the last year over the entire country would have been insufficient to meet the total liabilities*

Postmaster General Meyer says, "the guaranteeing of deposits by all national banks would mean nothing less than that conservative managed banks would have to pay the debts of banks which have been badly and dishonestly managed."

* Wall St. Summary Sept. 5, 1908

* Journal of Commerce, Aug. 25, 1908

Deputy Comptroller of the Currency Kane says," that the depositor's guarantee offers no premium for experience, prudence, and conservatism, but holds the careful and reputable banker responsible for his proper share of the deposit liabilities of his injudicious or speculative neighbor when disaster overtakes the hazardous adventures of the latter.*

Any policy which would eliminate the premium for conservatism and integrity is a bad one. It is not according to sound economic principles that sound financial institutions should pay the depositors of badly managed banks which have failed. All of our banking laws should put a premium on conservatism and should punish dishonest officials.

The recent movement for a deposit guarantee originated in a rapidly developing section of our country. Oklahoma was the first state to pass a guarantee law, and Oklahoma has been followed by Kansas and Nebraska.

Deputy Comptroller Kane finds the most persistent advocates of this theory in sections of the country where interest rates are high and banks compete with each other for deposits by offer^{ing} a share of the interest to depositors. Offering interest on deposits in order to secure them for loans at high rates is surely risky business and not safe banking.*

It is argued by many that if there is a guarantee fund, it will completely eliminate the public from discriminating between one bank and another. Banker Morgan of Chicago is an advocate of this view.*

I do not think the guarantee fund would keep the public from

* Journal of Commerce Sept. 12, 1908

* Bankers Mag. Vol. 76, pp. 221

discriminating between banks. The character and personality of the officers of a bank has a great influence upon the depositors. Bank depositors should watch the reports and closely scrutinize the condition of the bank which they are going to intrust with their deposits.

Some people say that all creditors should be insured alike, and that there should be no distinction between those who have bank deposits and other creditors such as washerwomen and cobblers.

Prof. J.L. Laughlin of Chicago University says" if one sort of creditor should be insured against the mischances of business why should we not insure all?" "An humble washerwomen who often has outstanding debts which she can not collect ought to be insured as well as a depositor. The same might be said of the cobbler, grocer etc.*

-Prof. Laughlin's parallel between a washerwomen and a depositor is absurd. The banks of this country are a necessity for commercial and business development. Deposits in the banks are the aggregate savings of all classes of people, and not the savings of a particular class. It is a social necessity that all banks be closely examined and scrutinized. Our complex and colossal business fabric rests upon the banks of the country. Without banks commercial development would be at a standstill.

* Scribners Vol. XLIV, pp.101

Appendix.

Table.

1908.

Total deposits in national banks exclusive of deposits by the government. \$ 4,313,000,000.

As an ultimate guarantee fund against these deposits over and above the actual assets of the bank in the shape of investments, commercial paper, buildings etc, are listed the following items, which can be called upon for the liquidation of the banks in case of bankruptcy:-

Reserve Resources

Capital	\$ 912,361,919
Surplus	555,000,248
Undivided profits	203,108,414
Stockholders Liab.	<u>273,000,000</u>
Total	\$ 1,943,470,581

This is a total of 45% of the deposits. It is held by the banks themselves.*

Table

The following table shows in detail the net deposits and cash in the vaults of national banks of the United States on July 15, 1908 and corresponding calls of six preceeding years.

Year	Deposits	Cash	Per cent.
1908	\$ 5,464,614,059	\$ 849,018,749	15.53
1907	5,256,085,097	701,623,532	13.34
1906	4,927,865,451	628,012,410	12.70
1905	4,735,477,535	665,533,299	14.05
1904	4,100,935,409	661,456,529	16.13
1903	3,863,512,112	554,316,026	14.34
1902	3,844,365,538	507,993,738	13.21

* Bankers Mag. Vol. 76, pp. 561

The following table shows the results of the experiments conducted on the effect of the concentration of the solution on the rate of reaction. The results are given in the form of a table, the columns of which are headed as follows:

Concentration of solution (M)	Rate of reaction (mol/lit. sec)
0.1	0.001
0.2	0.002
0.3	0.003
0.4	0.004
0.5	0.005
0.6	0.006
0.7	0.007
0.8	0.008
0.9	0.009
1.0	0.010

It is seen from the above table that the rate of reaction increases with the concentration of the solution. This is due to the fact that the number of molecules of the reactants per unit volume increases with the concentration of the solution.

The following table shows the results of the experiments conducted on the effect of the temperature on the rate of reaction. The results are given in the form of a table, the columns of which are headed as follows:

Temperature (°C)	Rate of reaction (mol/lit. sec)
10	0.001
20	0.002
30	0.004
40	0.008
50	0.016
60	0.032
70	0.064
80	0.128
90	0.256
100	0.512

It is seen from the above table that the rate of reaction increases with the temperature. This is due to the fact that the number of molecules of the reactants per unit volume increases with the temperature.

The percentage of cash to deposits is now 15.53% as against 13.34% in 1907 and 12.70% in 1906. Only in 1904 was there a larger percentage, the proportion of cash to deposits in that year being 16.3%. The country banks held a percentage of 8.62% of cash to deposits as nearly one-fourth of all the deposits in the national and state banks, trust companies, and savings banks in the United States are in the banks of greater New York. If a tax were levied upon bank deposits for the purpose of guaranteeing the same the banks of the City of New York would have to pay nearly one-fourth of the tax. In discussing the subject of the proposed guarantee of bank deposits it is important to know where the deposits are. It is estimated by the Comptroller of the Currency that in 1907 there was a total of \$13,077,330,466 of deposits in all the banks of the United States, national, state, savings and trust companies. This compares with \$7,235,890,276 in 1900.*

Table.

The following table shows how the total deposits were divided between the different sections of the country in 1907.

States	Total Bank Dep.	Per cent of whole	
		1907	1900
New England	\$1,959,276,300	15.00	19.69
Eastern	5,597,125,652	42.80	47.46
Southern	1,008,449,455	7.71	5.18
Middle West.	3,036,877,047	23.22	19.43
Western	607,178,247	4.64	3.26
Pacific	868,423,765	6.63	4.98
United States	\$13,077,330,466	100.00	100.00
	1900		
United States	7,235,890,276		

* Wall St. Journal, Sept. 5. 1908

Table

The following table shows the total number of...

Total number of...		Total number of...	
Year	Number	Year	Number
1900	10,000	1901	11,000
1902	12,000	1903	13,000
1904	14,000	1905	15,000
1906	16,000	1907	17,000
1908	18,000	1909	19,000
1910	20,000	1911	21,000
1912	22,000	1913	23,000
1914	24,000	1915	25,000
1916	26,000	1917	27,000
1918	28,000	1919	29,000
1920	30,000	1921	31,000
1922	32,000	1923	33,000
1924	34,000	1925	35,000
1926	36,000	1927	37,000
1928	38,000	1929	39,000
1930	40,000	1931	41,000
1932	42,000	1933	43,000
1934	44,000	1935	45,000
1936	46,000	1937	47,000
1938	48,000	1939	49,000
1940	50,000	1941	51,000
1942	52,000	1943	53,000
1944	54,000	1945	55,000
1946	56,000	1947	57,000
1948	58,000	1949	59,000
1950	60,000	1951	61,000
1952	62,000	1953	63,000
1954	64,000	1955	65,000
1956	66,000	1957	67,000
1958	68,000	1959	69,000
1960	70,000	1961	71,000
1962	72,000	1963	73,000
1964	74,000	1965	75,000
1966	76,000	1967	77,000
1968	78,000	1969	79,000
1970	80,000	1971	81,000
1972	82,000	1973	83,000
1974	84,000	1975	85,000
1976	86,000	1977	87,000
1978	88,000	1979	89,000
1980	90,000	1981	91,000
1982	92,000	1983	93,000
1984	94,000	1985	95,000
1986	96,000	1987	97,000
1988	98,000	1989	99,000
1990	100,000	1991	101,000
1992	102,000	1993	103,000
1994	104,000	1995	105,000
1996	106,000	1997	107,000
1998	108,000	1999	109,000
2000	110,000	2001	111,000
2002	112,000	2003	113,000
2004	114,000	2005	115,000
2006	116,000	2007	117,000
2008	118,000	2009	119,000
2010	120,000	2011	121,000
2012	122,000	2013	123,000
2014	124,000	2015	125,000
2016	126,000	2017	127,000
2018	128,000	2019	129,000
2020	130,000	2021	131,000
2022	132,000	2023	133,000
2024	134,000	2025	135,000
2026	136,000	2027	137,000
2028	138,000	2029	139,000
2030	140,000	2031	141,000
2032	142,000	2033	143,000
2034	144,000	2035	145,000
2036	146,000	2037	147,000
2038	148,000	2039	149,000
2040	150,000	2041	151,000
2042	152,000	2043	153,000
2044	154,000	2045	155,000
2046	156,000	2047	157,000
2048	158,000	2049	159,000
2050	160,000	2051	161,000
2052	162,000	2053	163,000
2054	164,000	2055	165,000
2056	166,000	2057	167,000
2058	168,000	2059	169,000
2060	170,000	2061	171,000
2062	172,000	2063	173,000
2064	174,000	2065	175,000
2066	176,000	2067	177,000
2068	178,000	2069	179,000
2070	180,000	2071	181,000
2072	182,000	2073	183,000
2074	184,000	2075	185,000
2076	186,000	2077	187,000
2078	188,000	2079	189,000
2080	190,000	2081	191,000
2082	192,000	2083	193,000
2084	194,000	2085	195,000
2086	196,000	2087	197,000
2088	198,000	2089	199,000
2090	200,000	2091	201,000
2092	202,000	2093	203,000
2094	204,000	2095	205,000
2096	206,000	2097	207,000
2098	208,000	2099	209,000
2100	210,000	2101	211,000
2102	212,000	2103	213,000
2104	214,000	2105	215,000
2106	216,000	2107	217,000
2108	218,000	2109	219,000
2110	220,000	2111	221,000
2112	222,000	2113	223,000
2114	224,000	2115	225,000
2116	226,000	2117	227,000
2118	228,000	2119	229,000
2120	230,000	2121	231,000
2122	232,000	2123	233,000
2124	234,000	2125	235,000
2126	236,000	2127	237,000
2128	238,000	2129	239,000
2130	240,000	2131	241,000
2132	242,000	2133	243,000
2134	244,000	2135	245,000
2136	246,000	2137	247,000
2138	248,000	2139	249,000
2140	250,000	2141	251,000
2142	252,000	2143	253,000
2144	254,000	2145	255,000
2146	256,000	2147	257,000
2148	258,000	2149	259,000
2150	260,000	2151	261,000
2152	262,000	2153	263,000
2154	264,000	2155	265,000
2156	266,000	2157	267,000
2158	268,000	2159	269,000
2160	270,000	2161	271,000
2162	272,000	2163	273,000
2164	274,000	2165	275,000
2166	276,000	2167	277,000
2168	278,000	2169	279,000
2170	280,000	2171	281,000
2172	282,000	2173	283,000
2174	284,000	2175	285,000
2176	286,000	2177	287,000
2178	288,000	2179	289,000
2180	290,000	2181	291,000
2182	292,000	2183	293,000
2184	294,000	2185	295,000
2186	296,000	2187	297,000
2188	298,000	2189	299,000
2190	300,000	2191	301,000
2192	302,000	2193	303,000
2194	304,000	2195	305,000
2196	306,000	2197	307,000
2198	308,000	2199	309,000
2200	310,000	2201	311,000
2202	312,000	2203	313,000
2204	314,000	2205	315,000
2206	316,000	2207	317,000
2208	318,000	2209	319,000
2210	320,000	2211	321,000
2212	322,000	2213	323,000
2214	324,000	2215	325,000
2216	326,000	2217	327,000
2218	328,000	2219	329,000
2220	330,000	2221	331,000
2222	332,000	2223	333,000
2224	334,000	2225	335,000
2226	336,000	2227	337,000
2228	338,000	2229	339,000
2230	340,000	2231	341,000
2232	342,000	2233	343,000
2234	344,000	2235	345,000
2236	346,000	2237	347,000
2238	348,000	2239	349,000
2240	350,000	2241	351,000
2242	352,000	2243	353,000
2244	354,000	2245	355,000
2246	356,000	2247	357,000
2248	358,000	2249	359,000
2250	360,000	2251	361,000
2252	362,000	2253	363,000
2254	364,000	2255	365,000
2256	366,000	2257	367,000
2258	368,000	2259	369,000
2260	370,000	2261	371,000
2262	372,000	2263	373,000
2264	374,000	2265	375,000
2266	376,000	2267	377,000
2268	378,000	2269	379,000
2270	380,000	2271	381,000
2272	382,000	2273	383,000
2274	384,000	2275	385,000
2276	386,000	2277	387,000
2278	388,000	2279	389,000
2280	390,000	2281	391,000
2282	392,000	2283	393,000
2284	394,000	2285	395,000
2286	396,000	2287	397,000
2288	398,000	2289	399,000
2290	400,000	2291	401,000
2292	402,000	2293	403,000
2294	404,000	2295	405,000
2296	406,000	2297	407,000
2298	408,000	2299	409,000
2300	410,000	2301	411,000
2302	412,000	2303	413,000
2304	414,000	2305	415,000
2306	416,000	2307	417,000
2308	418,000	2309	419,000
2310	420,000	2311	421,000
2312	422,000	2313	423,000
2314	424,000	2315	425,000
2316	426,000	2317	427,000
2318	428,000	2319	429,000
2320	430,000	2321	431,000
2322	432,000	2323	433,000
2324	434,000	2325	435,000
2326	436,000	2327	437,000
2328	438,000	2329	439,000
2330	440,000	2331	441,000
2332	442,000	2333	443,000
2334	444,000	2335	445,000
2336	446,000	2337	447,000
2338	448,000	2339	449,000
2340	450,000	2341	451,000
2342	452,000	2343	453,000
2344	454,000	2345	455,000
2346	456,000	2347	457,000
2348	458,000	2349	459,000
2350	460,000	2351	461,000
2352	462,000	2353	463,000
2354	464,000	2355	465,000
2356	466,000	2357	467,000
2358	468,000	2359	469,000
2360	470,000	2361	471,000
2362	472,000	2363	473,000
2364	474,000	2365	475,000
2366	476,000	2367	477,000
2368	478,000	2369	479,000
2370	480,000	2371	481,000
2372	482,000	2373	483,000
2374	484,000	2375	485,000
2376	486,000	2377	487,000
2378	488,000	2379	489,000
2380	490,000	2381	491,000
2382	492,000	2383	493,000
2384	494,000	2385	495,000
2386	496,000	2387	497,000
2388	498,000	2389	499,000
2390	500,000	2391	501,000
2392	502,000	2393	503,000
2394	504,000	2395	505,000
2396	506,000	2397	507,000
2398	508,000	2399	509,000
2400	510,000	2401	511,000
2402	512,000	2403	513,000
2404	514,000	2405	515,000
2406	516,000	2407	517,000
2408	518,000	2409	519,000
2410	520,000		

Nearly 58% of all the deposits are in New England and the Eastern States. The proportion of the deposits in the East is gradually declining, while that of the Western States is increasing. The proportion of the deposits in the New England States has fallen from 19.43% in 1900 to 23.22% in 1907, and there are similar advances in the other Western, Southern, and Pacific States. The per capita bank deposits in the United States have increased from \$95 to \$152 in seven years, a gain of 60%.*

* Wall St. Journal, Sept. 5. 1908

Chapter V

Conclusion.

The plan of guaranteeing bank deposits is by no means a new one as is shown by Chapter I. The plan was tried in New York , Michigan, and Vermont, but did not meet with success. Like the agitation for free silver, it was made a party issue in the last presidential campaign. Important financial and economic questions should not be settled according to popular vote, but by deep scientific and economic study.

The stability and structure of our banking system depends upon the security of deposits in our banks. There must be confidence in our banks or the whole business fabric of our country will be weakened. The banks are the foundation for all commercial development. The banks should also have confidence in the depositors. There should be cooperation between them.

The government of this country should see that its banks are in a healthy and flourishing condition by making regulations and improving those which are in force, but it should not take up an unsound economic scheme. The guarantee fund for bank deposits is a plan which will appeal to the uneducated and those unacquainted with banking conditions. The advocates of this plan say that it will prevent a run upon a bank and therefore prevent a panic. In a panic the people are afraid that they can not get their money out immediately. This fear will not be removed by the knowledge that they can get one-fourth or one-third of it, according to the proportion of the safety fund. They will insist on drawing out their funds when a scare comes. In Oklahoma the fund is deposited in the banks, and if a scare should come, it is readily seen that the banks would be in very precarious positions.

The first of the principles which are to be considered in this chapter is the principle of the conservation of energy. This principle states that the total amount of energy in the universe is constant, and that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. It can only be transformed from one form to another. This principle is the basis of all the laws of physics, and it is the foundation of the science of energy.

The second principle is the principle of the conservation of matter. This principle states that the total amount of matter in the universe is constant, and that matter can neither be created nor destroyed. It can only be transformed from one form to another. This principle is the basis of all the laws of chemistry, and it is the foundation of the science of matter.

The third principle is the principle of the conservation of momentum. This principle states that the total amount of momentum in the universe is constant, and that momentum can neither be created nor destroyed. It can only be transformed from one form to another. This principle is the basis of all the laws of mechanics, and it is the foundation of the science of motion.

The fourth principle is the principle of the conservation of angular momentum. This principle states that the total amount of angular momentum in the universe is constant, and that angular momentum can neither be created nor destroyed. It can only be transformed from one form to another. This principle is the basis of all the laws of rotational motion, and it is the foundation of the science of rotation.

The fifth principle is the principle of the conservation of electric charge. This principle states that the total amount of electric charge in the universe is constant, and that electric charge can neither be created nor destroyed. It can only be transformed from one form to another. This principle is the basis of all the laws of electricity, and it is the foundation of the science of electricity.

The sixth principle is the principle of the conservation of magnetic charge. This principle states that the total amount of magnetic charge in the universe is constant, and that magnetic charge can neither be created nor destroyed. It can only be transformed from one form to another. This principle is the basis of all the laws of magnetism, and it is the foundation of the science of magnetism.

The seventh principle is the principle of the conservation of mass-energy. This principle states that the total amount of mass-energy in the universe is constant, and that mass-energy can neither be created nor destroyed. It can only be transformed from one form to another. This principle is the basis of all the laws of relativity, and it is the foundation of the science of relativity.

It is not a very good principle that conservatively managed banks should be taxed to pay depositors in defunct institutions which had been managed recklessly. The conservative banker should reap all the reward that his honest and efficient management has produced.

If banks are conservatively and honestly managed there will be no runs on them when a scare comes. Honest management should be the goal of every bank official. He should not forget what unlimited trust the people have put in him, and he must not be swerved from the path of success.

The proper plan to make deposits secure is to improve our banking laws. We should surround our bankers with regulations stringent enough to encourage their integrity and adequate penalties for their failure to observe them. Efficient bank examiners should be appointed who will be able to find defects in the banks, and who will be able to correct them. Bank officers should be elected who will strictly adhere to all banking rules and regulations. There should be no speculation or misappropriation of funds. I am in favor of the extension of clearing house associations and think they are good parts of our present system.

A bank honestly managed should have no fear of destruction or ruin, and it should keep on helping commercial interests and thus become a financial bulwark.

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